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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
LABOR LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
Two of the cases decided by the court during the past term
made important additions to the jurisprudence of labor rela-
tions.
The case of greater significance was Douglas Public Service
Corp. v. Gaspard' which decided issues of federalism in the
regulation of collective bargaining practices, and the constitu-
tionality of Louisiana's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act.' 2 This
case arose out of a strike which apparently resulted when the
employer and the union representing his employees were unable
to agree on the terms of a new contract. The plaintiff-employer
sought an injunction restraining alleged acts of trespass upon
its property as well as violence, actual and threatened, upon
certain of its officers and employees. The district court dis-
missed the case on motions of the individual defendants (mem-
bers of the union) and the Supreme Court granted appropriate
writs to review that action. The defendants relied principally
upon two points to sustain the trial court's dismissal: (1) that
their conduct, as alleged in the plaintiff's petition, constituted
an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, and since the dispute admit-
tedly affected interstate commerce, the National Labor Relations
Board was the exclusive forum for its redress, and (2) that the
state's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" forbids the granting of
injunctive relief in cases arising out of labor disputes.
The first of these contentions called for an application of
the principles set forth in the celebrated Garner case3 decided
by the United States Supreme Court at its 1953 term. It was
there held that a state court was without jurisdiction to enjoin
picketing which (though peaceful) comprised an unfair labor
practice under the federal act because the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board was regarded, in the circum-
stances, as being exclusive. It was specifically emphasized that
the Court was not confronted with "a case of mass picketing,
threatening of employees, obstructing the streets and highways,
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 74 So.2d 182 (La. 1954).
2. LA. R.S. 23:821-849 (1950).
3. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776
(A.F.L.), 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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or picketing homes." And the Court added, "We have held that
the state still may exercise 'its historic powers over such tra-
ditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use
of streets and highways.' "4
The Louisiana Supreme Court, clearly aware of the federal
issue involved, nevertheless held that the lower court erred in
denying the injunction on this ground since the allegations of
the petition (accepted as true for the purpose of passing upon
the exceptions) had made out a case, for state intervention to
protect the type of interest regarded as excepted in the Garner
case. The opinion of Chief Justice Fournet on this point reflects
a clear appreciation of the problem, treats it in a clear and
lucid fashion, and, it is submitted, reaches the only acceptable
conclusion.
On the second issue of the case, however, there is basis
for real difference of opinion. Louisiana's "Little Norris-La-
Guardia Act," like its federal prototype, forbids the courts to
exercise their jurisdiction to issue injunctions in cases arising
out of labor disputes unless, after hearing held pursuant to
personal notice, the court finds (1) that unlawful acts have been
threatened or committed, (2) that substantial and irreparable
injury to property will ensue unless enjoined, (3) that the bal-
ance of the equities favors the plaintiff, (4) that action pro-
tected by the statute is not sought to be enjoined, (5) that there
is no adequate remedy at law and (6) that the police have failed
or are unable to protect plaintiff's property. An exception is
made to permit the issuance of a temporary restraining order
on at least forty-eight hours' notice in cases where it is alleged
that the holding of such a hearing will render substantial and
irreparable injury to the plaintiff's property unavoidable. 5
A temporary restraining order had been issued in this case,
but was thereafter dissolved by the trial court and plaintiff's
petition was dismissed because it was regarded as "insufficient
to constitute an allegation of violence and/or threats so exces-
sive as to render resort to the courts necessary for the preser-
vation of peace and order."6
It is not entirely clear that the trial court rested its decision
on the anti-injunction statute, and under the circumstances, as
4. Id. at 488.
5. LA. R.S. 23:844 (1950).
6. 74 So.2d 182, 186 (La. 1954).
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noted by Justice Hamiter in his concurring opinion, it was seem-
ingly unnecessary to pass upon the issue of the constitutionality
of the legislation at all. It would have sufficed to send the case
back with directions to the district court to hold the hearing
required by the act. However, the defendants contended that
the act was a bar to injunctive relief and the court reached
and decided that issue, holding that the legislation conflicted
with the provisions of Section 6 of Article I of the State Consti-
tution declaring that "All courts shall be open and every person
for injury done him in his rights, lands, goods, person or repu-
tation shall have adequate remedy by due process of law and
justice administered without denial, partiality or unreasonable
delay." In stating its conclusion the majority opinion says, "It
follows that the provisions of the so-called anti-injunction act
that seek to limit the jurisdiction of the district courts of this
state in the granting of immediate relief, if that is necessary
for the protection of rights and property, are illegal and ineffec-
tive."'7 There is no further or more detailed expression of opin-
ion concerning which of the express findings required by the
statute "unreasonably delays" the administration of justice.
It must be conceded that the time required for holding a
hearing to determine the facts prescribed by the anti-injunction
act will result in some delay-a delay that was never encoun-
tered during the heyday of the ex parte labor injunction. But
the legislature, in enacting the statute, had concluded that
justice under such circumstances was too swift to be altogether
sure. It had declared as the policy of the state that "Legal pro-
cedure that permits a complaining party to obtain sweeping
injunctive relief that is not preceded by or conditioned upon
notice to and hearing of the responding party . . . is peculiarly
subject to abuse in labor litigation [for enumerated reasons],""
and expressly conditioned the granting of injunctive relief upon
a series of findings made at a hearing. Thus, in the balancing
of interests of employers and their property on the one hand,
and employees and their right to engage in concerted activity
on the other, the legislature prescribed a policy of minimal
delay of forty-eight hours. Indeed, in a sense, the legislature
was heeding rather than ignoring the constitutional exhortation
of due process by providing reasonable notice and opportunity
to be heard to workers prior to enjoining them in the exercise
7. Id. at 187.
8. LA. R.S. 23:843 (1950).
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of their right to engage in concerted activity. No reasonable
person wishes to see the owners of property denied their right
to have legal protection of their interests. At the same time,
however, equally reasonably minded persons, familiar with the
dark history of labor injunctions, do not wish to see a return
to the practices of those days. The statute in question repre-
sents the legislative judgment of a fair compromise between
the competing interests in this area.
Justice Hawthorne, in a strong dissent, emphasized the fact
(undisputed by the majority) that the legislature had not pro-
hibited the courts from issuing injunctive relief and persuasively
argued that the forty-eight hour notice and hearing require-
ment was but another instance in which the legislature has tra-
ditionally regulated the issuance of a variety of judicial writs.
He cited a formidable list of statutory restrictions upon the
use of injunctions many of which have been expressly sus-
tained against attack and all of which are accepted without
serious question as to their validity. And certainly the exist-
ence of these restrictions in other fields is relevant. If "due
process of law" is to be equated with "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice"9 or "legal proceedings accord-
ing to those rules and principles which have been established
in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforce-
ment of private rights,"' 0 it is difficult to explain how the court
can conclude that the forty-eight hour notice and hearing pro-
vision is invalid in a labor injunction setting, but similar re-
strictions (or outright prohibition of the remedy) are sustained
in others.
The other labor case decided at the past term, Robichaux v.
Texas & N.O.R.R.,11 illustrates one of less frequently mooted,
but nevertheless natural and logical implications of the concept
of collective bargaining-the determination of individual em-
ployee's rights through action taken by the union representing
him in the bargaining process. The plaintiff-engineer, employed
by the defendant railroad, had been discharged for alleged
violations of company rules. The question whether the plain-
tiff's discharge was for "just and sufficient cause" within the
meaning of the collective bargaining agreement between the
9. Mr. Justice Stone in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945), quoting from Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
10. Mr. Justice Fields in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).
11. 72 So.2d 305 (La. 1954).
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railroad and the union (of which the plaintiff was a member)
was thereafter submitted to arbitration at the union's insistence
in response to the plaintiff's written request to the union to do
so. The arbitration proceeding resulted in an order of rein-
statement of the plaintiff to his former job, but provided that
under the circumstances there should be no provision for back
pay lost during the term of his unemployment.
After accepting re-employment and in disregard of the com-
pensation proviso of the award, the plaintiff instituted suit for
back pay for the period of his unemployment, contending that
the union was without authority to compromise his case. In
rejecting his claim and dismissing his case the court said, "Even
if the union was without authority as contended by appellant,
though we do not concede this, appellant accepted the settle-
ment and is bound by it."'12 On the facts of the case the decision
seems entirely correct and any other result would have been
open to serious question.
The more difficult aspect of this type of case is presented
where the individual has not accepted the settlement, or en-
gaged in any activity which may be construed as acceptance.
The courts in such cases are squarely confronted with the issue
which the court here left open-whether a clear agency has
been established on the part of the union to make the settle-
ment in question, and if not, whether such an agency is neces-
sary in order to give binding validity to the agreement that has
been effected. A natural reluctance to permit the rights of indi-
viduals to be conclusively disposed of by third parties points
in the direction of requiring a specific agency to be spelled out.
On the other hand, however, respect for the integrity of the
collective bargaining process demands that finality and author-
ity be accorded the agreement that has been made between
the representatives of the parties. This consideration is given
added emphasis by the terms of the National Labor Relations
Act and the Railway Labor Act, which put the employer under a
statutory duty to bargain with the union as the representative
of his employees-and should therefore be entitled to expect
that the bargains he makes will be respected and enduring.
The United States Supreme Court, when confronted with this
issue in 1945,18 decided by a five-four vote that "For an award
to affect the employee's rights, therefore, more must be shown
12. Id. at 306.
13. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
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than that the collective agent appeared and purported to act for
him. It must appear that in some legally sufficient way he author-
ized it to act in his behalf." 14 The decision met with a storm of
protest from employers and unions alike, as well as from the
governmental agency charged with the administration of federal
legislation, and upon rehearing the decision was affirmed, but
in a modified form which recognized that "custom and usage
may be as adequate a basis of authority as a more formal au-
thorization for the union, which receives a grievance from an
employee for handling, to represent him in settling it ... .
Applying the test as thus formulated to the instant case, the
written request from the plaintiff to the union would seem to
supply the authorization required.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Alvin B. Rubin*
PUBLIC CONTRACTS
In Board of Levee Commissioners v. Lacassin1 a motion had
been made to authorize the chief engineer of the Board of Levee
Commissioners to advertise for bids for a lease on certain prop-
erty owned by the board "for a period not to exceed one year."
A detailed lease proposal and a form of the proposed lease were
prepared containing an option to renew for two years.
The Supreme Court held that since the form of the lease
had been prepared by the board's employees, "any one who was
led to bid in accordance with all the terms contained in the form
of lease, had the right to expect that the Board would abide with
all of its provisions after acceptance of his bid."'2 In addition
the court stressed that, subsequent to the receiving of bids, the
board authorized its president to enter into a contract of lease
with the successful (and only) bidder "'in accordance with the
General and Special Specifications ... all in accordance with
his bid . . . which is hereby accepted .... ' ,,3 The court did not
14. Id. at 738.
15. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661, 663 (1946).
* Member, Sanders, Miller, Downing, Rubin & Kean, Baton Rouge; Part-
time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 74 So.2d 52 (La. 1954).
2. Id. at 55.
3. Ibid.
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